We examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously-issued executive stock options. We identify properties of reset options, develop a model for valuing resettable options, and characterize the "rms that have reset options. We "nd the vast majority of options are reset at-the-money, resulting, on average, in the strike price dropping 40%. Our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex-ante value of an option award, but the ex-post gain can be substantial. Finally, we "nd resetting has a strong negative relation with "rm performance even after correcting for industry performance.
Introduction
Executive stock options have long been touted as an e!ective way of reducing agency costs by aligning managers' interests with those of shareholders.
See, e.g., &Stock swings make options a hot topic' by J. Lublin, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1997. Although these options are typically issued with "xed terms, anecdotal evidence suggests that their parameters are sometimes altered, especially when declining share prices have moved the options out-of-the-money. This paper examines data on the resetting of executive stock options, with a view to understanding the prevalence of resetting and its impact on the value of option awards. We focus on three main issues.
Our "rst question concerns the valuation e!ect of resetting. We seek to quantify the impact on the value of the original option of the possibility that the terms of the option could be reset during the option's life. To this end, we develop a model of option pricing that admits this feature and allows for both strike price and maturity to be changed at the time of reset. Appealing to results from the literature on barrier options, we describe closed-form solutions for the value of &resettable' options in a Black-Scholes environment.
In the second part of the paper, we examine data on resetting events. Using a large sample of publicly traded "rms, we identify the distribution of price declines that trigger resetting. We also explore the characteristics of the reset options. These include the relation between the new strike price, the old strike price, and the current price of the stock; and that between the maturity of the reset option and the time left to maturity on the original award. Combining this information with our valuation model, we compare the values of resettable options to the prices that would obtain if resetting were ruled out. This enables us to identify the bene"t, ex-ante as well as ex-post, that results from resetting.
In the "nal section of the paper, we attempt to characterize "rms that have reset executive stock options. We test for relations between the frequency of resetting and such variables as "rm size, ownership and management structure, and performance relative to industry. We also examine whether the incidence of resetting varies systematically across industries, a consideration motivated by the most common defense of resetting as a method of reducing employee turnover.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 discusses a theoretical framework for valuing options whose terms could be altered before maturity. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents information on resetting events, and properties of the reset options. Section 6 combines this data with the valuation model of Section 3 to obtain an estimate of the impact of resetting on option values. Section 7 examines the common characteristics of "rms that have reset options. Section 8 concludes.
We believe that di$cult interpretation issues cloud analysis of such data. For example, managers may expect option resetting to occur because of past practices by the "rm or informal promises made by the board of directors, and with this knowledge they might delay announcements of operating improvements until after the resetting event.
Related literature
The explosive growth in the use of executive stock options over the last two decades has been accompanied by increased academic interest in the subject. Among the issues that have been the focus of recent research are: the valuation of executive stock options (Rubinstein, 1994) ; the e!ect of reporting costs on the use of stock options (Matsunaga, 1995) ; the e!ectiveness of options as a means of compensation (Yermack, 1995) ; the timing of option awards (Yermack, 1997) ; the price impact of early-exercise decisions (Carpenter and Remmers, 1998; Seyhun, 1992) ; and the use of options with &reload' provisions (Hemmer et al., 1996 (Hemmer et al., , 1997 .
The resetting of previously-issued stock options, however, remains a little explored topic that has been addressed in just three papers. Two of these, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) and Saly (1994) , study resetting induced by extraordinary circumstances. Gilson and Vetsuypens look at incidences of resetting by "rms in "nancial distress; their sample covers the period 1981}1987. Saly focusses on incidences of resetting following the stock market crash of 1987. The third paper, Chance et al. (1997) examines resetting in more &normal' circumstances, and focusses on two issues: deriving a valuation model for options that may be reset, and examining the timing and incentive impact of resetting by comparing the performance of "rms prior and subsequent to the resetting event.
There are some commonalities between our paper and that of Chance, Kumar, and Todd, but there are two important di!erences. The "rst is empirical focus. Our paper aims to characterize "rms that have reset options, to identify the features of the typical reset option, and to use this information to derive a value for the resettable option. However, we are not explicitly interested in the incentive e!ects of resetting, and, in particular, do not examine the post-resetting behavior of "rms' share prices. Second, resetting in the valuation framework of Chance, Kumar, and Todd involves a change in only the option's strike price and not its maturity. Our data indicate that maturity changes are an important component of resetting, a!ecting nearly half of all reset options; consequently, our valuation incorporates this feature.
A framework for valuing resettable options
In this section, we discuss the valuation of options whose terms could be reset at some point before maturity. Since our framework will allow for both maturity and strike price to be changed at the time of reset, the model applies equally to the case where new options are issued replacing the old ones. Given this paper's motivation, we focus solely on call options, though the arguments extend more generally.
We use the following notation. The current stock price is denoted S. The original strike price and maturity date of the option are denoted K and ¹, respectively. The current time is taken to be date 0, so the time left to maturity on the original option is also given by ¹. Finally, we let CH denote the initial value of the resettable option.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. In Section 3.1, we consider the case of (contingent) &deterministic' resetting, in which the option terms are reset with certainty the "rst time the stock price falls below a pre-speci"ed &barrier' denoted H. Then, in Section 3.2, we examine the situation in which the resetting event (e.g., the barrier H) may be random.
Deterministic resetting
Resetting the terms of the option involves specifying a new strike price and/or maturity date. Throughout this section, we assume that when the option is reset, the new strike price is given by some pre-speci"ed value KH. (For example, if the new option is issued at-the-money, then KH equals the barrier H.) Maturity, for the vast majority of cases in our sample, is either left unaltered at the time of reset or is reset to 10 years, the length of the original option (see Section 5 below). Motivated by this, we consider two possibilities in our model:
1. Maturity is unchanged: the reset option also has maturity date ¹. 2. Maturity is changed, and the reset option is given a "xed maturity of years from the time it is rewritten.
We look "rst at the case where maturity is left unaltered.
When maturity is not changed
To value the resettable call in this case, consider a portfolio consisting of a knock-out call option and a knock-in call option, both with maturity ¹ and barrier H, and where the knock-out call has strike K and the knock-in call has strike KH. Let C(S, K, H, ¹) and C (S, KH, H, ¹) denote the respective prices of the two options given the current stock price of S. If the stock price does not breach the barrier H by time ¹, the payo! from this portfolio arises entirely from the knock-out call; however, if the barrier is breached before ¹, then the payo! is entirely from the knock-in call. Therefore, the time-¹ payo! from this portfolio is (S 2 !K)> if the stock price does not cross H before ¹, (S 2 !KH)> if the stock price crosses H at some point before ¹.
These payo!s are exactly the same as those of the resettable call. It follows that the value CH of the resettable call must satisfy
Thus, the problem of valuing the resettable call may be reduced to one of valuing the barrier options C and C . The latter problem is not a di$cult one. Barrier options have been widely studied in the "nance literature and are well understood. Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) have derived closed-form expressions for the barrier options C and C in a Black-Scholes environment (see also Merton, 1973) . We present their solutions here. Let denote the volatility of stock returns, and let r and q denote, respectively, the rate of interest and the dividend payout rate on the stock. De"ne the terms d , d
, and by
If N( ) ) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution, the BlackScholes price of a European call with strike K and maturity ¹ is given by
From (2) to (5), the prices of the barrier options C and C are easily described:
In Section 6, we will use these closed-form expressions to obtain working estimates of the increase in value, both ex-ante and ex-post, that resetting provides for an option.
When maturity is also reset
Under the second alternative, the value CH of the original option can be expressed as the sum of a knock-out call option with barrier H, strike K, and maturity ¹; and a knock-in option which has barrier H and strike KH, and which has years of life from the time it gets knocked-in, provided knock-in occurs before date ¹. (If knock-in does not occur by ¹, the option expires worthless.) The knock-out option is the same as in the earlier case. The knock-in option is di!erent; to distinguish it, we will denote its value by C K (S, KH, H, ¹, ). In this notation, the value CH of the resettable option is given by
Thus, CH may be identi"ed from the values of the barrier options C and C K . Although the latter is somewhat non-standard as a barrier option, it is not hard to value. In a Black-Scholes environment, a closed-form expression for C K may be derived using results from Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) (see Appendix A in Brenner et al., 1998) . To describe this expression, de"ne , r, and q as in Section 3.1.1, and let a, b, and d be given by
Then, letting C denote the Black-Scholes price (5) and N( ) ) the cumulative standard normal distribution, it may be shown that
Random resetting
When the resetting event is random, hedging-or replication-based arguments cannot be used to derive arbitrage-free prices of resettable options, since the uncertainty in the resetting process cannot be hedged. Here is a simple example that illustrates this point.
Consider a two-period binomial model in which the initial stock price is 100, and the stock price goes up or down by 10% in each period. Let the risk-free rate of interest per period be 2%. Suppose that we have a two-period call option in this model with an initial strike of 100. Suppose also that if the stock touches a price of 90 before the option expires, then with probability q, the option's strike is reset to 90, and with probability (1!q) it is left unaltered. The option's maturity is not touched.
If q"0, resetting never occurs, so this is a standard call option. The usual arguments show that its initial value is approximately 7.27. If q"1, resetting is Nor is it possible to &complete' this market by using derivatives which are de"ned on the model's primitive assets. This is intuitive. Like the primitive assets, all such derivatives must have the same value in states 2 and 3; there is no way they can replicate a security whose payo!s di!er at these nodes. deterministic, and the option can be valued using the procedure described in Section 3.1.1. A simple calculation shows that the initial value of the option in this case is about 9.35.
If 0(q(1, then resetting is random. In this case, there are three possible states of the world at the end of one period: one in which the stock price is 110 (&state 1'), the second in which the stock price is 90 and the option will be rewritten (&state 2'), and the third in which the stock price is 90 and the option will not be rewritten (&state 3'). Since we have only two primitive assets (the stock and the bond) to bridge three states of nature, the market is incomplete, and there is no way to price the option by hedging arguments.
It 
Letting p range over the interval (0, 0.40) of feasible values, it is seen that any price between 7.27 (which corresponds to the case q"0) and 9.35 (which corresponds to the case q"1) can arise as a &risk-neutral value' of the call. There is no reasonable way to restrict the price of the option between these two limits based solely on arbitrage arguments.
The data
Our data for analysis of executive stock option resetting comes from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database. ExecuComp reports annual compensation data for the top "ve o$cers in a sample of 1500 "rms, including those companies in the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. In the release of ExecuComp that we use, we extract records for all executives who have nonzero holdings of stock options. As shown in Table 1 , this candidate sample includes 30,607 person-year observations between 1992 and 1995. Resetting events reported by ExecuComp 457
Elimination of observations for which the reported resetting had occurred in a prior year (55)
Addition of observations miscoded by ExecuComp 4
Events that represented technical changes to option terms and not genuine resettings (10) Net resetting events in sample 396 Frequency of all observations 1.30%
Information successfully obtained from proxy statements 333
Individual award &tranches' studied 806 Table 1 provides detail about our procedure for identifying stock option resetting events. ExecuComp records for each executive include a 0}1 indicator variable that equals 1 if the company publishes a &10-Year Option Repricings' table in its annual proxy statement and includes data about that particular executive in the table. According to SEC rules e!ective since 1992, companies must publish this table following any year in which the exercise prices of executive options are lowered, and the table must report information for any similar event that occurred during the prior 10 years involving a current o$cer, whether or not that person had any options reset in the most recent year. Since some executives listed in these tables will not have had options reset during the most recent "scal year, ExecuComp's variable for identifying resetting events is over-inclusive. We therefore read copies of proxy statements from a variety of on-line sources to verify the accuracy of the variable.
As shown in Table 1 , ExecuComp's resetting indicator equals 1 for 457 individual person-years in our sample, and we were able to obtain proxy statement detail for all but 63 of these events. We dropped 55 of ExecuComp's observations because the executive in question had options reset only in earlier years and not the most recent one. An additional four observations were recoded from 0 to 1 to correct errors in reporting by ExecuComp. Finally, 10 more observations were dropped because the resetting event involved only technical or inconsequential changes to the options which are outside the scope of our study, such as the permanent "xing of exercise prices that had been contingent on the company's performance.
Unfortunately, the SEC's disclosure rules do not appear to apply to cases in which companies change the maturities of options while leaving their exercise Table 2 Changes in options exercise prices and expirations Changes in executive stock option exercise prices and expiration dates for a sample of 806 award tranches whose terms were modi"ed during 1992}1995. The sample is drawn from Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database. Of the 806 events, 38 represented the second or third repricing of an award during a single "scal year; 92 involved the surrender by the executive of some options involved in the resetting. prices the same, and we found no reports of these types of events. Our "nal sample for analysis thus includes 396 executives with options reset in a given "scal year; most of these events involved multiple executives in a smaller set of 134 companies who reset option terms in a given year. We were able to obtain detailed data reported by the company for 333 of the 396 executives with reset options. For these 333 executives, the resets involved adjustments to the terms of 806 individual award tranches (up to a maximum for 10 for one person), and we generally use individual tranches as the unit of analysis in the remainder of the paper. Our ability to exploit Standard and Poor's transcription of proxy statement data into the ExecuComp database yields a sample several times larger than that used by Chance et al. (1997) , who use a keyword search of proxy statement databases to generate a sample of 74 resetting events involving 40 companies. Along with the larger sample, the major advantage of our approach to data gathering is the availability of a well-de"ned universe of sample "rms, which allows us to report below such statistics as sample-wide frequencies of option resetting. Table 2 gives basic descriptive statistics about our resetting events, all of which by de"nition involve changes to the options' exercise prices. The table shows that almost half of these cases also involve changes to time remaining in the option's life. While the large majority of these adjustments represent increases in option lives at the same time that exercise prices are lowered, in Initial option awards are usually made at-the-money. Since virtually all options in our sample were reset at or above the prevailing market price, the 39% average lowering of the strike implies that share prices for "rms in our sample fell, on average, over 39% between the grant of the original award and the time of reset. a small handful of cases "rms either shorten the option life when lowering the exercise price, or raise the exercise price when lengthening the option's term. In other cases, comprising about 11% of the tranches analyzed, the company receives some consideration from the executive at the time of the option resetting, such as the surrender and cancellation of some fraction of the options involved. Finally, in some cases companies reset the terms of the same option tranche two or even three times in one "scal year; about 5% of the observations that we analyze fall into this category.
Expiration Expiration Expiration

Features of reset options
The overwhelming majority of executive stock option resets occur when declining stock prices push the awards out of the money (see Section 7 below). Under these circumstances, a company wishing to raise the values of these options can lower their strikes or lengthen their maturities (or do both). In this section, we describe the typical changes to an option's parameters conditional upon it being reset. Unfortunately, as mentioned in Section 4, the SEC's rules do not require companies to report changes that a!ect solely an option's maturity. Our sample, therefore, contains no resetting event in which the strike was una!ected.
Two important questions concerning the impact of resetting on the strike price are: (i) the relation between the new strike price and the market price of the stock at the time of reset, and (ii) the percentage change in the original strike price from resetting. Fig. 1 addresses these questions. It shows that only two of the 806 reset options in our sample had their strikes raised from their original levels; the remaining 804 had their strikes lowered.
Of those options whose strikes were lowered, almost 80% were reset at-themoney with their strike prices set to the prevailing market prices at the time of reset. Most of the remaining 20% had their new strike prices set above prevailing market prices. A small fraction of the reset options, about 1.5% of the total, had their strike prices reset below prevailing market prices. Fig. 1 also describes the distribution of the percentage change in the strike prices of the reset options. The distribution is roughly symmetric; it indicates that in about a tenth of all cases, the change in strike price was small (the new strike price was 90% or more of the old strike price). The typical changes, however, were much larger. The mean and median changes were, respectively, 39.1% and 40.1%. In over one-third of the cases, the strike was lowered by 50% or more; and in a tenth of all cases, it was lowered by at least 70%. Maturity was una!ected by the resetting process in a little over half the cases in our sample. Of the remainder, the overwhelming majority (about 45% of the total) had their maturities increased; however, in a small handful of cases (about 1.6% of the total), the maturity was reduced. Fig. 2 describes the change in maturity for those options whose maturities were extended. The "gure shows that about 80% of these options were given a new maturity of exactly 10 years from the time of reset, while a further 13% were given a new maturity of exactly "ve years. Since the life of the typical executive stock option is 10 years, with "ve years being a popular alternative, these "gures suggest that the reset options were, in terms of maturity, essentially like new option grants.
For those options whose maturities were extended, Fig. 2 also describes the distribution of the increase in the time to maturity a!orded by the reset. The distribution is highly skewed. Although about a tenth of the options received extensions of six years or more, the increase in maturity was under 30 months in most cases, with a mean increase of 30.1 months. Given that most of these options were granted a new maturity of 10 years, these "gures suggest that the options were typically far from maturity at the time of reset, and indeed, a check of the data con"rms this. For the options whose maturities were extended, the mean time left to maturity at the time of reset was 78 months, with a median of 88 months. Since resetting added about 30 months to the average, the mean time left to maturity for this subsample subsequent to resetting was about 108 months. The "gure was lower, but not substantially so, for the sample as a whole: post-resetting, the average time remaining to maturity was a little under eight years at 92 months, with a median of 102 months.
An important unresolved issue is whether "rms used lengthening an option's maturity as a partial substitute for lowering its strike price. Although the data does not allow us to identify "rms that lengthened maturity alone, we can examine a weaker version of this question: whether increases in an option's maturity were more likely when its strike was not lowered all the way to current market price. Table 2 presents information on the joint distribution of changes in strikes and maturities. The table indicates that not only is longer maturity not used as a substitute for a lower strike, but that the two may even be complements to an extent. Maturity was extended in only 39% of the cases where the new strike was set above the prevailing market price. However, where the new strike was set equal to the prevailing market price, over 47% of the options also had their maturities extended.
These "ndings on the characteristics of reset options correspond well along one dimension, but not the other, with those reported by Chance et al. (1997) . As with us, Chance, Kumar, and Todd "nd that the overwhelming majority of reset options are reset at-the-money; this results, in their sample, in an average lowering of the strike price of 41.3%, a "gure close to our sample average of 39.1%. However, fewer than a tenth of the option awards in their sample had their maturities extended; for those extended, the average extension was over six years. In contrast, changes in maturity were e!ected in almost half the awards in our sample, but } although most of these options were given a new maturity of 10 years } the average extension was only 30 months. As a consequence, while Chance, Kumar, and Todd "nd that the average time left to maturity on the reset options was only around 66 months, it is substantially higher in our sample at 92 months.
Estimating the value of resettable options
By combining the information of the previous section with the valuation models of Section 3, this section attempts to obtain an estimate of the value of resetting to the holder of the option. Some preliminary issues are important in this context.
One is the choice of model to be used. Although an assumption of random resetting may be intuitively appealing, it is unhelpful from a practical standpoint for two reasons. First, as we have discussed in Section 3.2 above, it is not possible to derive a theoretical fair price for such an option using hedging arguments. Second, the stochastic resetting process is not observable; its parameters must be estimated from the data on options that have been reset. This is a nontrivial (and probably impractical) task. It requires us, for example, to identify not only the price histories of the stocks on which options were reset, but also all other stocks which had similar histories but did not have any experience of resetting.
We discard the hypothesis of random resetting, therefore, and aim in Section 6.1 at estimating the value of resetting using a deterministic model. We do this by comparing an option that is reset the "rst time a barrier is breached to a benchmark option that is never reset. Complementing this analysis, in Section 6.2, we look at the point of resetting and examine the ex-post increase in option value that results. Once again, as the benchmark, we use an option that is never reset. In each case, we use information described in the previous section to identify cases of interest.
Throughout this section, we assume an underlying Black-Scholes environment and use barrier option pricing formulae derived on this basis to estimate the value of resetting. It is true that our formulae may not be fully representative of executive stock option values, since the latter involve nontradeability constraints and are Bermudan rather than European in style. These are not unimportant considerations, but they are peripheral to our purpose here. We seek to understand the impact of resetting on option values, and from a qualitiative standpoint, any benchmark model will su$ce. Given its widespread use, the Black-Scholes model is a natural choice.
An ex-ante valuation of resetting
In this subsection, we estimate the value of resetting under the assumption of Section 3.1 that the option gets rewritten with certainty the moment the stock price falls below a given barrier. All options are assumed to be European. As mentioned above, our valuation is done in a Black-Scholes environment. The attractiveness of this speci"cation is that closed-form solutions are available for the price of a resettable option, as we described in Section 3 above.
Since our data indicate that reset options are overwhelmingly priced at-themoney, we will make this assumption throughout. Concerning maturity, we examine the two dominant cases indicated by the data: where maturity is undisturbed, and where the option is given a fresh life of ten years. The benchmark option for comparisons will be a 10-year call issued at-the-money that is never reset.
Based on the formulae from Section 3, we can compute the increases over the benchmark that result from resetting in each of the two cases. Table 3 describes the percentage increases for a variety of possible values of the barrier and return volatility. In carrying out these computations, interest and dividend payout rates were held "xed at 5% and 2%, respectively; the results do not alter substantially if these parameters are varied within reasonable limits.
It is well known that an increase in volatility does not always lead to an increase in the value of a knock-out option, since the probability of the option getting knocked out also increases alongside. Table 3 re#ects this feature: for most values of the barrier, the percentage gain from resetting is not monotonically increasing in the level of volatility. For example, when the barrier is "xed at 90% of the initial stock price, the gain from resetting falls from 8.83% to 4.32% as volatility increases from 20% to 40%.
For any "xed value of volatility, the bene"t of resetting initially increases as the barrier falls and then also starts declining. This pattern arises from the interplay of two o!setting e!ects: as the barrier becomes lower, the probability of the barrier ever being breached falls, but the event delivers greater value to the option holder. For the range of values considered in Table 3 for volatility, the percentage increase in value from resetting is highest when the barrier lies Table 3 Increase in ex-ante option value created by resetting Increase in the initial value of an at-the-money 10-year European call option if the option is reset with certainty when the stock price falls below a speci"ed barrier. The stock price is assumed to follow a Black-Scholes process with volatility . The initial stock price is taken to be 100, the rate of interest to be 5%, and the rate of dividend payouts to be 2%. In the table, (i) &Barrier as % of S' refers to the barrier expressed as a percentage of the initial stock price S; (ii) &% gain: only K reset' refers to the percentage gain in option value (over the benchmark Black-Scholes value) if the option's strike is reset at-the-money when the barrier is touched, but its maturity is una!ected; and (iii) &K and ¹ reset' refers to the percentage gain if the option's strike is reset as above and its maturity is reset to 10 years. between 60% and 70% of the initial price. This implies a drop of 30}40% in the strike price upon resetting, a "gure surprisingly close to the mean and median values of 40% we found in the data (see Section 5). Finally, Table 3 indicates that the bene"t from resetting is increased substantially when maturity is also reset alongside the strike. For example, in Table 3 , for a barrier equal to 70% of the intial stock price, the percentage increase in value over the benchmark resulting from resetting ranges from 10.3% to 13.1% if only the strike is reset. For the same parameter values, the bene"t varies between 14% and 18.6% if the maturity is also reset.
Overall, Table 3 indicates that, for reasonable parameter choices, the ex-ante bene"t from resetting can go up to 13.1% if only the strike is altered and to over 18% if maturity is also reset to 10 years. However, these "gures are probably exaggerated by the assumption that the option is reset with certainty at the barrier. This assumption appears a strong one given the data. We will see in the next section that the "rms that experienced the greatest proportion of resetting were those that had three-year returns of !30% or less; even in these "rms, however, under a "fth of all options were reset.
If an option is not reset with certainty at the barrier, we have shown that it is not possible to derive a hedging-based price for the option. We can, nonethless, obtain a crude estimate of its value by considering its &expected value'. We have seen that the maximum possible ex-ante bene"t from deterministic resetting is 17}18%. If the probability of resetting is taken to be about 25% (a higher number than the data would suggest), then the expected ex-ante bene"t from resetting is only around 4.50%. Thus, from an ex-ante standpoint, the possibility that the option may be reset if the stock price falls su$ciently does not appear to a!ect option values substantially.
An ex-post valuation of resetting
Since resetting involves a lowering of the strike price of an out-of-the-money option to the current stock price, from an ex-post standpoint the value of the option increases considerably over the benchmark. Of course, the actual increase depends on a number of factors including (i) the relationship between the stock price at the time of reset and the initial stock price, (ii) the time left to maturity on the original option, and (iii) whether maturity is reset alongside the strike. Note that it does not matter for a post-hoc comparison of this sort whether the original model of resetting was stochastic or deterministic. Table 4 gives quantitative expression to the amount of increase as a percentage of the benchmark value. As earlier, it is assumed that the option is initially issued at-the-money and that if it is reset, it is reset at-the-money. The table considers "ve possible levels of the stock price at reset time, and for each level of the stock price it considers "ve possible values for the time left to maturity on the original option at the time of reset. Volatility in the table is "xed at 30%.
From a qualitative standpoint, Table 4 o!ers no surprises. It shows that the less the time left to maturity or the lower the stock price at reset time, the greater the bene"t from resetting. It also indicates that a resetting of the strike increases the bene"t to the holder substantially, especially where the di!erence between the new and old maturities is large.
The results are more interesting when viewed quantitatively. To take a typical case, suppose the option is reset when the stock price is 30% below its original value. The table shows that gain to the holder of this option is at least 36.9% of the benchmark value, and could be as much as 67%, depending on the time left to maturity at the reset time. If maturity is also reset, the increases in value go even higher: from 41.7% when only a year has gone by since the issuance of the original option to 118% when "ve years have elapsed. In all cases, therefore, resetting results in a substantial bene"t to the option holder. Table 4 Increase in ex-post option value created by resetting Ex-post increase in option value if the strike of the option is reset at-the-money at some point when the stock price is below the initial strike price. The benchmark option is an option with the same initial parameters and which cannot be reset. The table compares the value of the reset option to that of the benchmark immediately subsequent to resetting. Five values are considered for the stock price at which resetting occurs. For each value, the increase in value from resetting is computed for "ve cases, distinguished by the time left to maturity when the barrier is "rst touched. The stock price is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion with volatility "0.30. The initial stock price is S"100, the initial strike is K"100, the initial maturity is ten years, and the interest and dividend rates are 5% and 2%, respectively. In the table, (i) &Time to maturity' refers to the time left to maturity on the original option when the barrier is "rst touched, (ii) &% increase: only K reset' refers to the increase in value over the benchmark when only the strike is reset, and (iii) &% increase: K and ¹ reset' refers to the percentage gain if the option's maturity is also reset to 10 years. 
Characteristics of resetters
In this section, we examine the last of the three questions raised in the introduction: what are the characteristics common to "rms that reset the terms of previously-issued executive stock options? We begin by examining "rms' stock price performance before resetting. Fig. 3 summarizes the relationship between stock price performance and the frequency of resetting, with observations organized according to three-year raw returns to shareholders. Though there is no a priori reason why resetting should not follow favorable performance, the "gure shows that resetting in practice is overwhelmingly associated with negative returns. A strong monotonic relation is evident between prior performance and the likelihood of resetting. For "rms with three-year returns between !10% and 0%, fewer than 3% of executives had options reset. This frequency rises steadily as shareholder return worsens, reaching 18% for "rms whose three-year return is !30% or worse.
As we have seen, virtually all resetting involves a reduction in an option's strike and, possibly, a lengthening of its maturity. As such, resetting transfers value from stockholders to managers. Since resetting also overwhelmingly follows stock price declines, it e!ectively rewards managers when their "rm performs poorly. In this section, we use the data to investigate several rationales that companies often use to justify this practice.
Most commonly, "rms argue that resetting is necessary for under-performing "rms to retain their managers, who will be more likely to accept new contracts from rival "rms if their stock-based compensation loses value. This argument presumes that a "rm should want to retain managers who oversee a stock price decline; if so, we should expect more resetting when all "rms in an industry The stock return includes the year during which the repricing event occurs. Industry-adjusted returns are raw stock returns minus the mean returns over the same period for other sample companies with the same two-digit SIC code.
perform poorly, which suggests they are victims of a common negative shock rather than bad management. For the same reason, we should expect no relation between resetting and "rm performance adjusted for industry returns. Figs. 4 and 5 address these issues and appear to contradict the hypotheses. Fig. 4 shows that the inverse, monotonic relation between performance and resetting remains after industry average stock returns (at the two-digit SIC level) are subtracted from raw returns. Fig. 5 plots the industry-wide frequency of resetting against three-year stock performance. The "gure shows no discernable patterns. Around half of all industries had some incidence of resetting during our sample period, but not all such industries were low performers. Indeed, the distribution of returns across industries with some resetting is almost identical to that across industries with none. The industries with some resetting form a disparate group, with no apparent common characteristics. The list includes some industries classi"ed as human-capital intensive (such as electronics, motion pictures, and health services) but also includes others that are not (textile mills, chemicals, and wholesale trade), and excludes some that are (personal services, insurance, and brokerages). We conclude that resetting does not generally occur as a result of industry-wide shocks, and we "nd no evidence that resetting is concentrated in industries where managerial talent is especially important. Ideally, we would like to explore whether resetting is more prevalent in industries with high rates of executive turnover. However, broad-based data of this type is not available from public sources, and hand-collecting the information for the thousands of executives in our sample would require a formidable commitment of time and resources.
Apart from retaining managerial talent, "rms also justify resetting as necessary for options to deliver meaningful performance incentives: lowering the exercise price undeniably raises pay-performance sensitivity of out-of-the money options. One compensation consultant asserted to us that out-of-the-money options are disliked by managers, even though they have potential future value, and that boards view them as &negative incentives' that must be eliminated lest they demoralize the workforce. The negative association between resetting and prior performance shown in Figs. 3 and 4 is super"cially consistent with this argument, since larger gains in pay-performance sensitivity arise from resetting if options drop far out-of-the-money.
Our data indicate a clear inverse association between resetting and "rm size. Over our sample period, fewer than 0.3% of executives of S & P 500 "rms had their option terms reset, while the frequency quadruples to 1.2% for S&P MidCap 400 "rms, and almost doubles again to more than 2% for S&P SmallCap 600 "rms. This relation also suggests that "rms are more likely to reset options when the event delivers a greater improvement in incentives, since at-the-money options issued by small companies have greater pay-performance sensitivity than the same value of options issued by large companies. The results with respect to "rm size do not appear attributable to the higher share price volatility of smaller "rms. In any given range of three-year stock returns, the rate of resetting is higher for smaller "rms in our sample than larger ones. For example, in the performance range between !10% and !20%, the resetting frequency is about 6% for SmallCap "rms, 4% for MidCap "rms, and 1% for S&P 500 "rms.
Of course, arguments justifying resetting for incentive reasons ignore its reputational consequences, since executives might expect repeated resetting of the same options if the "rm's shares continued to lose value after the "rst event.
To avoid moral hazard problems that could arise from such beliefs, we conjecture that when resetting occurs, it should substitute for other compensation awards that a manager might ordinarily expect to receive. Regression analysis of managers' compensation, presented in Table 5 , contradicts this hypothesis.
We estimate three models: a logit model of whether the executive receives a new stock option award during years in which resetting occurs; a Tobit model of the Black-Scholes value of new stock options granted during the year; and an OLS model of the log of total compensation, including cash pay, bene"ts, long-term bonus payouts, and the value of restricted stock and new options. We include a range of control variables commonly used in large-sample studies of executive compensation: executive stock ownership, "rm size, "rm performance, Tobin's Q, a dummy variable for the nonpayment of dividends to proxy for cash scarcity, and dummy variables representing years and whether the executive serves as Chairman or CEO. In all three models, we "nd positive associations between resetting and additional compensation received, implying that executives with abnormally large pay packages are more likely rather than less likely to have their options reset. From this evidence, we strongly reject the conjecture that resetting serves as a substitute for other elements of an executive's pay.
Our regression results, as well as our results for "rm size and "rm performance, all suggest that resetting represents a windfall for poorly performing managers rather than a necessary adjustment in incentives or a device for retaining talent. A stronger version of this claim is that managers use their power over corporate governance in order to appropriate wealth from stockholders in various forms, including resetting. The inverse association between "rm size and resetting seems consistent with this hypothesis, as smaller "rms Table 5 Association between option resetting and new option awards Regression estimates of the association between stock option resetting and various measures of executive compensation. The "rst column presents logit estimates of a model with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the executive receives a new stock option award. The second column presents a Tobit model with the dependent variable equal to the Black-Scholes value of the executive's option award. The third column presents an ordinary least squares model with the dependent variable equal to the log of total compensation, de"ned as the sum of salary, bonus, bene"ts, payouts from long-term incentive plans, and the value of new stock option and restricted stock awards. have less ownership by powerful institutional investors and are less monitored by the "nancial press. We explore this argument further in Table 6 , which examines the impact of ownership and management structure on the sample frequency of resetting. Unsurprisingly, one variable that appears to be important in this context is the presence of a disclosed con#ict of interest in the board of directors compensation committee. When such a con#ict exists, the frequency of resetting is almost 80% higher than otherwise. A second factor that is also signi"cant is the separation of the jobs of CEO and chairman of the board. However, our "nding is counterintuitive: when the CEO and chairman are the same person, resetting is a third less likely than when the jobs are separated. Somewhat surprisingly, most other factors that might indicate greater managerial power have insigni"cant associations with resetting. For example, the frequency with which the options of chairmen and CEOs were reset was roughly the same as the frequency for, respectively, nonchairmen and non-CEOs. Nor does board membership or large stock ownership appear to make resetting more likely. In Table 7 , we estimate logistic regressions of the incidence of resetting as a function of the same corporate governance and ownership variables analyzed in Table 6 . The results indicate a strong positive association between resetting and the presence of a con#ict of interest on the board's compensation committee, con"rming our earlier "nding. None of the other variables has a signi"cant estimate, and we no longer "nd a signi"cant association between resetting and the uni"cation of the CEO and chairman positions. Control variables at the bottom of the table indicate that resetting is associated negatively with "rm size, negatively with stock performance, and positively with the industry's stock return volatility; inclusion of these control variables in di!erent combinations does not change our conclusions about the governance and ownership variables.
In summary, the two distinguishing features of "rms that reset options appear to be poor stock price performance and small size. No industry-speci"c and few "rm-speci"c factors appear important.
Conclusions
In recent years, stock options have become an important component of executive compensation. To provide a credible incentive, it would appear important that the terms of the options not be amended, especially when declining share prices push them out of the money. Nonetheless, evidence from the popular press suggests that such &resetting' or &repricing' does take place. We analyze data on resetting to understand its prevalence and characteristics, and develop a model for estimating the impact of resetting on the value of option grants.
We examine the incidence of resetting in a comprehensive sample of "rms of all sizes between 1992 and 1995. We "nd that 1.3% of all executives in those "rms had options repriced in a given year, with average exercise price reductions of about 40%. Almost half of these repriced options also had their maturities lengthened, typically receiving a new expiration of 10 years.
We "nd that resetting is monotonically related to negative performance, with its incidence increasing as performance worsens; this remains true even after correcting for industry performance. Resetting is also more common in smaller "rms which tend to be less publicly visible. We also explore the importance of other industry-and "rm-speci"c factors, but do not "nd many of signi"cance.
Finally, we explore a model of option pricing that allows for the possibility of resetting, and examine the impact that resetting has on the value of the initial award. From an ex-ante standpoint, we "nd that the impact is small; even for implausibly large parameter values, the bene"t from resetting is only around 15% of the initial award value. From an ex-post standpoint, however, the bene"t can be substantial, amounting to an increase in the value of the option by a factor of 100% or more.
